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Abstract 
The evaluation of the economic efficiency of regulatory schemes is essential for regulators 
and utilities. In this study it is analysed for the first time the welfare costs of the regulation in 
the water supply in England and Wales, by computing the deadweight loss of the water only 
companies (WoCs) that existed over the period of 1993-2009. The results indicate that the 
current regulation can have substantial efficiency costs. Our estimates show that the loss of 
efficiency for the WoCs lies between 15 and 60 million GBP over the period 1993-2009. 
These amounts could have been redistributed either to the companies in terms of profits or 
to the consumers via price reductions. The methodology and results of this study are of 
great interest for both regulators and water utilities managers to evaluate the effectiveness 
of regulation and make informed decisions. 
Keywords: profits; deadweight loss; water industry  
1. Introduction 
Water and sewerage services are usually provided in monopoly regimes. Hence, as other 
network industries, the water and sewerage industry in many countries is regulated 
following different approaches (Worthington, 2014; Molinos-Senante et al. 2015). As water 
supply is a large market covering more than 99% of the population, the potential welfare 
effects of prices set at levels that do not represent the cost of production are potentially 
important. Apart from transfers between consumers and producers, the pricing of a good 
can lead to a deadweight loss, i.e. a loss of economic efficiency in monetary measure that 
can occur when the consumer price is not equal to the marginal cost. This question is all the 
more important as regulation of utilities has been questioned over the last thirty years as 
several network industries that evolved historically as state-owned enterprises have been 
privatized (Zhang et al. 2015). 
Regulators can define models of pricing to avoid a loss of economic efficiency. In the ideal 
case, regulators are completely informed about the costs of the firm and consumer demand 
elasticities so they can define second-best pricing to ensure a balance budget constraint for 
the firm and to avoid a deadweight loss (Boiteux 1960). Because of this lack of information, 
regulators have to define incentives – such as price-cap schemes – to ensure cost-reduction 
and consumer access to goods which often have public service characteristics. In this 
framework developed by Laffont and Tirole (1993) among others, firms want to convince the 
regulator that they have higher costs than they are actually, in order to have price-caps 
higher than their cost of production1 and can capture profits. It creates a deadweight loss 
from prices that are too high. Under this fixed-price regulatory contract, firms have 
incentives to fully exploit their cost opportunities by exerting the optimal amount of effort to 
decrease their cost of production and increase their margins.  
Focusing on England and Wales, after the privatization process of the water industry in 1989, 
the Regional Water Authorities formed the water and sewerage companies (WaSCs) 
whereas the Statutory Water Companies formed the water only companies (WoCs) (Stone 
and Webster 2004). Several studies in the past analysed the impact of privatization and 
regulation on the efficiency and productivity of water companies only in the water industry 
                                                          
1 Note that cost of production does not consider environmental and resource costs but focused on investment 
and operational costs. 
in England and Wales (Molinos-Senante et al., 2014; Maziotis et al. 2015a; 2015b). Most of 
the past evidence therefore refers to the WaSCs where WoCs have always been studied 
together with WaSCs. We note that WaSCs are responsible for water and sewerage services 
whereas WoCs are in charge of water supply activities only. Only one study evaluated WoC’s 
performance over the period 1995/96 – 2004/5. Hence, in this paper we add to the debate 
over the impact on regulation on the performance of WoCs by calculating the welfare costs 
of regulation.  
The aim of this study is to analyze the welfare costs of the regulation in the water supply in 
England and Wales, by computing the deadweight loss of the WoCs providing clean water 
services that existed over the period of 1993-2009. To achieve this, it is proposed a setting to 
compute the deadweight loss from non-marginal-cost pricing of marginal water 
consumption under different assumptions for demand elasticity. Computation of the 
margins and predictions of the demand of water under different price levels, assuming 
conservative levels of price-elasticity allow us to report welfare effects estimates from the 
adoption of the regulation. This methodology is applied on WoCs which are responsible for 
the supply of drinking water services. 
This paper contributes to the current strand of literature on water utilities and welfare 
economics as follows. First, it shows that contrary to other regulated industries and common 
wisdoms, water supply in the UK has low-margins, even though these low-margins can have 
strong welfare impacts. Second, it shows that regulation can have efficiency costs for the 
market as it implies negative profits for the firm. Therefore, the methodology and results of 
this study are of great interest for both regulators and water utilities managers to evaluate 
the effectiveness of regulation and make informed decisions. Undoubtedly, the calculations 
used in the paper could be refined but the analysis shows that profits and losses are not only 
transfers between producers and consumers but can have important welfare impacts. 
Therefore, policy makers should particularly be interested by the potential distortions of the 
current regulatory tools. This paper is also of interest for researchers as our methodological 
approach is generally applicable and can be expanded to other regulated industries such as 
coal, electricity, natural gas or even oil.2  
 
2. Methodology 
It is proposed a simple setting to compute the deadweight loss from non-marginal-cost 
pricing of marginal water consumption under different assumptions for demand elasticity. 
The calculation is based on the standard formula to compute the deadweight loss for each 
company 𝑖 on a given year 𝑦:  
𝐷𝑊𝐿𝑖,𝑦 =
(|𝑄1−𝑄0|∗|𝑃−𝑀𝐶|)
2
              (1) 
where 𝑄1 is the predicted water consumption at the marginal cost 𝑀𝐶 and 𝑄0 is the 
observed water consumption level at current price 𝑃. 𝑄0, 𝑀𝐶 and 𝑃 can directly observed 
from the dataset3. In order to compute 𝑄1, first it is needed to compute how consumption 
would change after a change in the price from 𝑃 to 𝑀𝐶. The change in consumption ΔQ can 
be computed using the simple price-elasticity formula:    
ΔQ =
(MC−P)
P
∗   ∗ 𝑄0                           (2) 
where  is the price-elasticity of demand. 𝑄1 is then computed as the sum of 𝑄0 and ΔQ. 
Note that demand is a linear curve while supply is supposed to be perfectly elastic. This 
assumption is realistic as in the water industry, infrastructure for transportation and 
distribution can be scaled up at near constant marginal cost. It is also then easier to compute 
the marginal cost as it is not needed a cost function for the water companies. 
It is helpful to go through an example to understand the aforementioned computations. For 
instance, in 2000, company C1 has a margin of 11 cents per cubic meter of water consumed 
and 11.2 million cubic meters consumed this year. The cost of production per unit is 64 cents 
and the revenue per unit is 75 cents. Using the formula (1), it is possible to compute the 
expected demand if the price per unit was 64 cents, i.e. if there were no margins. In this 
                                                          
2 Borenstein and Davis (2012) and Davis and Muehlegger (2011) studied the deadweight loss resulting from 
non-marginal cost pricing for natural gas in the US. Porcher (2014) applied a similar framework in the French 
water public service and Davis (2014) discussed the welfare effects of fuel subsidies worldwide.  
3 In this study, information on marginal cost and price was no available in the dataset. Hence, additional steps 
to compute these variables are needed. They are specified in the sample data section. 
case, the increase in demand under the hypothesis of a price elasticity of -0.8 would be  1.3 
million cubic meters. Hence, the expected demand at the marginal price would imply 
consumption to be equal to 12.5 million cubic meters for the year 2000. Using the formula of 
the deadweight loss, the deadweight loss would be equal to: 
DWLc1, 2000 =  
(12.5−11.2)×(0.75−0.64)
2
 = 70,413 GBP. 
The same computation is repeated every year for each company to compute the deadweight 
loss under three different levels of price elasticity -0.2, -0.5 and -0.8. The level of elasticities 
are not taken randomly but are based on a range of price elasticities found in previous 
studies (see Arbues et al. (2004) and Espey et al. (1997) for a literature review). Very few 
studies examined the water price elasticity of demand for household use only in England and 
Wales. For instance, Moran and Dann (2008) assumed a price elasticity of demand for 
household use of - 0.2 whereas two reported by UKWIR (2003, 2008) suggest a lower value, - 
0.14 and - 0.15 during summer and -0.35 during non-summer period, respectively. 
Therefore, the assumptions regarding the water price elasticity of demand in our study are 
line with the evidence found in past studies. Rather than taking a strong stand on the 
magnitude of the credible elasticities, it is reported welfare effects estimates for a relative 
broad range of elasticities which allows narrowing results uncertainty.  
3. Sample Data 
Since the privatization of the English and Welsh water industry, there have been several 
mergers and acquisitions, WaSCs/WoCs and WoCs/WoCs, which resulted in having 21 
companies in 2009 – 10 WaSCs and 11 WoCs. Being natural monopolies, the economic 
regulator, the Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat) was set up to regulate industry’s 
performance and review water tariffs. The method of regulation has the form of price cap 
scheme and is designed to both give firms incentives to increase profits by reducing costs 
and eliminating the potential to manipulate output prices.  
As the primary focus of the paper is to determine the welfare costs of the regulation in the 
water supply in England and Wales, the analysis focuses on WoCs providing drinking water 
services that existed over the period of 1993-2009. The sources of data are the “June 
Reports for Water and Sewerage Companies in England and Wales” published by Ofwat at its 
webpage and companies’ annual financial performance reports. The sample is unbalanced as 
the number of WoCs reduced over the period of study due to mergers with other WoCs or 
their acquisition by WaSCs.  
Selecting inputs and outputs for evaluating regulated companies’ performance is a difficult 
task. It depends on the availability of data, the reliability of the available data and the 
expertise and experience of the analyst (De Witte and Marques 2010). Following past 
practice, 3 inputs and 1 output are selected (Saal and Parker 2001; Saal et al. 2011a; 
Molinos-Senante et al. 2014; Maziotis et al. 2015a; 2015b). Metered water consumption is 
selected as output and is taken from the companies’ regulatory returns to Ofwat. Regarding 
inputs, the first one is the capital stock which is proxy by Modern Equivalent Asset (MEA) 
based on current cost estimates of the replacement cost of the water companies´ existing 
capital stock. Subsequently it is employed a user-cost of capital approach, to calculate capital 
costs as the sum of the opportunity cost of invested capital and capital depreciation relative 
to the MEA asset values.  
The second input considered is labour expressed as the average number of full-time 
equivalent (FTE) employees which is available from the companies’ statutory accounts. 
Finally, the third input, namely other costs in nominal terms is defined as the difference 
between operating costs and total labour costs. Given the absence of data allowing a more 
refined break down of other costs, it is employed the UK price index for materials and fuel 
purchased in purification and distribution of water, as the price index for other costs, and 
simply deflate nominal other costs by this measure to obtain a proxy for real usage of other 
inputs (Maziotis et al. 2009). Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the data sample.  
***INSERT TABLE 1*** 
Margins are computed as the difference between revenues and total costs and subsequently 
it is computed the margin per unit, marginal cost and the potential market price. For each 
year and each company, the marginal cost and the price are then respectively computed as 
the average costs and average revenues. To do so, it is used the information on operational 
expenses to compute a per-unit cost of production similar to the marginal cost, under the 
assumption that there are no scale economies. Similarly, it can be computed the price per 
unit paid by consumers using the information on revenues. Even if these variables are 
computed, they provide a good proxy of marginal prices and costs.   
Regarding the assumption of no scale economies, Stone and Webster Consultants (2004) 
estimated a total and variable cost function and found negative scale economies for the 
WaSCs and constant returns to scale for WoCs at the respective sample means. Moreover, in 
the price reviews till 2004 Ofwat’s approach (Ofwat, 2004) to assess companies’ operating 
and capital expenditure efficiency was the use of cross section econometric techniques and 
unit cost models where constant returns to scale for WaSCs and WoCs were assumed. 
Therefore, following past practice (Stone & Webster Consultants, 2004; Ofwat, 2004) we 
assume that WoCs operate under constant returns to scale. 
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of margins over time. The unit of observation is a water 
company so the box plots show – from top to down - the maximum, third quartile, median, 
first quartile and minimum margins for each cubic meter sold for each year. For example, in 
1993, the average margin is 0.037 GBP/m3, meaning that on average the difference between 
the marginal price and the marginal cost of production is 0.037 GBP/m3. The maximum 
margin observed is a margin of 0.17 GBP per cubic meter and the minimum is a loss of 0.30 
GBP per cubic meter sold. The third quartile is 9.4 cents of GBP per cubic meter of water, 
meaning that 75% of WoCs have margins lower than this level and the first quartile is a loss 
of 3.2 cents of GBP per cubic meter consumed. This graph is instructive as it gives the reader 
a general appreciation of margins in water industries in the UK: margins tend to decrease 
over time and become negative or close to 0 after 2003. Such negative margins result from 
the regulation of water prices in the UK based on regular price-reviews giving incentives to 
decrease costs (Maziotis et al., 2014).  
***INSERT FIGURE 1*** 
Figure 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for margins by companies. This graph thus 
gives information about the spread in the evolution of margins between 1993 and 2009 for 
each company. For example, over the period, the water company C9 has a median margin of 
3 cents of GBP per cubic meter and its margins varies between a loss of 11.3 cents of GBP 
per cubic meter and a gain of 29 cents of GBP per cubic meter over time. The spread is thus 
40 cents of GBP per cubic meter over time while the price of water per unit is on average 
around 1 GBP per cubic meter consumed. The variation in margins is thus substantially high 
across time as this graph shows. In most cases, variations in margins are linked to changes in 
the price set by Ofwat.  
***INSERT FIGURE 2*** 
Figures 1 and 2 discussed above, illustrate that margins can be positive or negative in the UK 
water industry, thus imposing deadweight loss as customers might consume too little or too 
much water. 
4. Results 
This section describes the results of the setting proposed in the study. It is employed a 
straightforward exercise by computing the deadweight loss from non-marginal cost pricing 
of marginal water consumption at different levels of demand elasticity. With non-zero 
elasticity, volumetric charges above or below the marginal cost impose deadweight loss on 
the society as customers consume either too much or too little water. It is assumed that 
consumers do not exit or enter the market and that the deadweight loss observed in the 
water markets does not cause any distortions in related markets.  
A quick overlook at the computed statistics is helpful to understand the amplitude of the 
deadweight loss. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics per companies such as the margin per 
unit, observed and predicted consumption under the -0.8 elasticity level and the associated 
deadweight loss. The larger the amplitude of the margin or the loss, the larger is the gap 
between the observed and the predicted consumption and the larger is the welfare loss. For 
example, companies C3 and C12 grossly sell the same volume of water but C3 is close to a nil 
profit while C12 has pretty high margins of 20 cents per unit sold. Under a -0.8 price 
elasticity of demand, the average yearly deadweight loss is 46,000 GBP in the case of 
company C3 while it is 788,000 in the case of C12. Table 2 thus shows that the size of the 
margin or the loss as well as the level of the price elasticity of demand substantially impact 
the economic costs of price distortions.  
*** INSERT TABLE 2*** 
Figures 1 to 3 in the appendix report estimates of the deadweight loss, at the water industry 
level, under different plausible price elasticities, ranging from -0.2 to -0.8. Under a price-
elasticity of -0.2, the overall deadweight loss of the industry is 1.135 million GBP in 1993, and 
it is four times higher with a price-elasticity of -0.8. Table 3 reports the total deadweight loss 
for the WoCs over the period under different plausible price elasticities of demand, ranging 
from -0.2 to -0.8. The overall deadweight loss ranges from 15.4 million GBP to 61.5 million 
GBP under these hypotheses. The magnitude of the deadweight loss varies consequently to 
the level of elasticity with larger increases in consumer surplus for larger elasticities. Figures 
1 to 3 in the appendix show the share of the deadweight loss resulting from positive and 
negative margins. Negative margins are responsible for the majority of the deadweight loss 
in 1993, 2001 and from 2003 on: they represent for example 61% of the deadweight loss in 
1993 and more the quasi-total majority in 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2009. These negative 
margins foster a situation in which consumers experience higher welfare gains than under 
marginal cost pricing but it results in losses for the firm and to a deadweight loss as it 
enables transactions for which the willingness-to-pay of consumers is below the opportunity 
cost. On the contrary, positive margins create a deadweight loss because customers 
consume too little water. Interestingly, a large part of the deadweight loss is due to positive 
margins in the 1990s while the inverse situation occurs in the 2000s. These results show that 
regulation was probably too lax in the 1990s while it was too tight in the 2000s as the water 
companies barely managed to achieve economic profitability. Over the period, most of the 
deadweight loss comes from positive margins as the standard literature on monopolies 
would predict.  
Figures 4 to 6 in the appendix present the total deadweight loss over the period (1993-2009) 
for each company. C10 is the company with the largest deadweight loss over the period, 
ranging from 3.8 to 15 million GBP depending on the level of the elasticity. The deadweight 
loss only comes from negative margins. Company C13 is in the opposite situation, provoking 
a deadweight loss ranging between 1.5 million and 6 million GBP resulting from positive 
margins over the period. Because margins or losses are pretty low as depicted in Table 2, the 
overall deadweight loss per company for the whole 1993-2009 period is usually contained 
between 500,000 GBP and 2 million depending on the level of the price elasticity. However, 
for companies experiencing high levels of deadweight loss, the price-cap regulation seems to 
be tight as we would not expect the company to experience such repeated losses.  
5. Discussion and policy implications 
The setting-up of an independent water regulation authority is often seen as an interesting 
way to promote more pricing efficiency in regulated industries. However, efficient pricing in 
the UK water industry could have increased the overall surplus by 15 to 61 million GBP over 
the period of study. Even if these figures represent a small share of the overall turnover of 
the industry (0.4% in our dataset, similar to the estimates of Garcia and Reynaud (2003) and 
Porcher (2014)), this extra-surplus could be used for transfers to the poor or to avoid under-
investment on water networks.  
From a policy perspective and linking the results with the regulatory cycle, we conclude that 
during the years 1994-2000, when prices were tightened after the 1994 price review, profits 
increased. This finding is consistent with previous studies by Saal and Parker (2001), Saal et 
al. (2007) and Maziotis et al. (2009). The results suggest that even the substantial regulatory 
tightening after 1994, the period 1994-2000 could be characterised as a period of lax 
regulation since regulatory revenues almost always exceeded regulatory costs leading to 
high welfare losses for the customers.  
During the years 2000-2005, profits substantially decreased as companies were obliged to 
reduce the prices charged to customers due to the 1999 price review. Average regulated 
revenues were always below average regulatory costs indicating that the firms were 
required to eliminate at least some excess costs in order to regain economic profitability. 
This study demonstrates that after 2001 the English and Welsh water regulator was more 
focused on passing productivity benefits to consumers and maintaining stable profitability 
than it was in earlier regulatory periods. This finding is consistent with past studies by 
Bottaso and Conti (2003), Erbetta and Cave (2007) and Maziotis et al. (2009) where the 
authors suggested that the tightened 1999/00 price review had a positive impact on 
companies’ productivity indicating that both the most productive and the less productive 
firms had strong incentives to improve their productivity in order to regain economic 
profitability. Another study by Bottasso and Conti (2009) analysed the performance of WoCs 
only during the period 1995-2005 and concluded that productivity only slightly improved and 
more particularly after 2000 due to the 1999 price review when Ofwat imposed tougher X 
factors in the price cap formula, which might have provided strong incentives for water 
companies to improve efficiency and productivity. 
Water companies continued to experience welfare losses during the years 2005-2009 as 
their profits decreased. Even the 2004 lax regulatory setting after 2004, any gains from 
increases in output prices were offset by increases in input prices resulting in negative 
economic profitability (Maziotis et al. 2015a). The findings of this study are reinforced by 
Portela et al. (2011) and Molinos-Senante et al. (2014) where they studied the impact of 
regulation on companies’ productivity. The authors concluded that the decrease in 
productivity was larger in the period 2005/08 than in 2001/04. One reason for this 
deterioration in productivity might be the price cap imposed by the regulator in the 2004 
price review. Nevertheless, other factors (such as the rise in electricity prices and the 
reduction of leakages) might have contributed to higher operating and capital expenditures.  
Overall, in several countries, an “incentive regulation” has been implemented to ensure that 
firms reduce costs and innovate but this regulatory pricing can also lead to distortions on the 
market. It might be of interest to compare the results of this paper with those of Porcher 
(2014) which studies efficient pricing for French water companies. In France, prices are not 
set by a national regulator similar to the UK water industry where the economic regulator, 
Ofwat, reviews water tariffs, but by municipalities at the local level. Using a dataset of more 
than 4,000 French municipalities covering half of the French population, the author finds 
that marginal prices average about 8% more than marginal costs, leading to a small 
deadweight loss of 8 million euros for 2008 under a -0.2 to -0.3 price-elasticity of demand. 
Another paper by Garcia and Reynaud (2003) estimates the benefits of efficient water 
pricing in France and finds small efficiency gains – roughly 0.4% of initial surplus. The results 
of the paper can also be compared to those obtained in different industries.  
6. Conclusion 
Evaluating the impact of regulation in privatised industries is of great importance for 
regulators and companies. This is evident in the water industry in England and Wales where 
WoCs were privatized in 1989 and since then they have been subject to price cap regulation. 
In this study, for the first time, it is analysed the welfare costs of the regulation in the water 
supply in England and Wales, by computing the deadweight loss of the WoCs providing 
drinking water services that existed over the period of 1993-2009. 
The results illustrate that the current regulation can have substantial efficiency costs. 
Interestingly, a simple look at the descriptive statistics shows that margins are either slightly 
positive or slightly negative. There are however extreme situations: some companies have 
constantly negative margins while some others have constantly positive margins. A negative 
margin means that the company is making losses while a positive margin means that 
consumers experience losses in their surplus. In both cases, as the market does not clear at 
the marginal price, there is a deadweight loss and the surplus of the society as a whole could 
be increased by fixing prices at the marginal cost. Estimates of this study show that the loss 
of efficiency for the WoCs lies between 15 and 60 million GBP between 1993 and 2009. 
These amounts could have been redistributed either to the companies in terms of profits or 
to the consumers via price reductions. Such a result underlines the need to design tariffs 
properly covering costs and ensuring the right levels of consumption.  
From a policy perspective, the methodology and results of this study are of great importance 
for both regulators and water utilities managers to evaluate the effectiveness of regulation 
and make informed decisions. Potential distortions of regulatory tools should always be of 
great interest to policy makers. This paper makes an original contribution to meeting this 
challenge by computing deadweight loss of water companies to evaluate from a welfare 
economic perspective of the economic efficiency of regulatory price cap scheme. 
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TABLES 
 
Variables Mean Standard Dev. Min Max 
Economic costs (millions GBP) 56.02 59.62 5.45 374.81 
Economic revenues (millions GBP) 54.90 49.72 7.95 230.98 
Capital Input (millions GBP) 1008.578 934.01 
 
132.88 3872.89 
Capital price (GBP) 0.021 
 
0.007 0.009 0.045 
FTE employment 310.684 
 
247.164 53 1083 
Deflated other expenditure (millions GBP) 14.391 
 
14.061 1.548 74.209 
Other costs price deflator 1.733 0.446 1 2.787 
Consumption (‘000s cubic meters) 65.5 62.6 8.52 292 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Source: Own elaboration from OFWAT data 
 Water 
company 
Margin  
(GBP/m3) 
Water 
Consumption 
(103 m3) 
Predicted 
Water 
Consumption 
(103 m3) 
Deadweight 
Loss  
(GBP) 
C1 0.0801203 11,729 12,742 52,110 
C2 0.0105611 93,368 94,527 68,244 
C3 0.0200266 51,087 52,311 45,997 
C4 0.0589885 22,897 24,077 72,933 
C5 0.057592 22,513 23,602 187,338 
C6 -0.2220574 9,018 7,706 172,458 
C7 0.2048994 14,331 16,394 236,732 
C8 0.0364477 15,272 15,750 29,956 
C9 -0.0055893 50,158 50,029 219,811 
C10 -0.1472292 117,615 105,756 1,375,192 
C11 -0.2633438 65,004 52,961 1,604,367 
C12 0.2120245 52,654 59,063 78,7987 
C13 0.1001344 155,751 169,250 748,798 
C14 0.0763396 109,514 116,755 337,044 
C15 0.0401757 58,192 61,137 155,246 
C16 0.0397852 51,921 53,516 144,650 
C17 -0.2003357 20,230 17,622 296,543 
C18 0.1236774 29,948 32,433 154,255 
C19 0.0274029 102,006 105,075 64,949 
C20 0.1552026 9,656 10,450 109,383 
C21 -0.0202863 277,895 272,524 243,032 
C22 0.015067 213,830 217,212 163,498 
C23 0.1219347 41,752 46,104 283,072 
C24 0.0786834 14,615 15,758 54,590 
C25 -0.0717174 172,296 162,857 338,482 
Average 0.0320268 65,515 66,366 245,119 
Table 2. Mean margin per unit, mean consumption, predicted consumption at market price and 
deadweight loss under a -0.8 price elasticity. 
 
Note: this table presents the mean margin (in GBP), consumption (in thousands of cubic meters), predicted 
consumption (in thousands of cubic meters) and deadweight loss (in GBP) for each company over the 1993-
2009 period under the assumption of a -0.8 price elasticity of demand.  For example, under a -0.8 price 
elasticity of demand, the average deadweight loss of the company C39 over the 1993-2009 period is 338,482 
GBP while the average loss per unit made by the company is 7 cents.  If the company C39 had price set at 
the marginal cost, customers would have consume less water, 163 million cubic meters instead of 172 
million cubic meters on average per year. 
 Year  = -0.2 = -0.5 = -0.8 
1993 1,134,989 2,837,473 4,539,957 
1994 1,423,839 3,559,597 5,695,356 
1995 1,558,735 3,896,837 6,234,938 
1996 1,700,287 4,250,716 6,801,146 
1997 1,722,483 4,306,209 6,889,934 
1998 471,738 1,179,347 1,886,956 
1999 546,320 1,365,800 2,185,280 
2000 1,209,722 3,024,306 4,838,889 
2001 394,737 986,843 1,578,950 
2002 313,461 783,653 1,253,845 
2003 311,471 778,680 1,245,888 
2004 766,536 1,916,342 3,066,149 
2005 1,163,118 2,907,798 4,652,477 
2006 302,854 757,135 1,211,417 
2007 974,047 2,435,118 3,896,187 
2008 1,185,213 2,963,031 4,740,850 
2009 201,683 504,207 806,731 
TOTAL 15,381,237 38,453,094 61,524,950 
Table 3. Total deadweight loss in GBP under different level of elasticities 
Note: this table presents the total deadweight loss in GBP per year under different assumption for the 
elasticity of demand. For example, in 1993, under a -0.2 price elasticity of demand, the total deadweight loss 
of water only companies is 1.135 million GBP while it is 2.837 million GBP under a -0.5 price elasticity and 
4.540 million under a -0.8 price elasticity. The last line of the each column sums the deadweight loss for the 
whole period. For example, between 1993 and 2009, under a -0.8 price elasticity of demand, the cumulated 
deadweight loss of the water only companies is 61.525 million GBP.  
 
APPENDIX 
 
 
Figure 1. Industry's deadweight loss under a price-elasticity of -0.2 
Note: this figure depicts the computed deadweight loss for the sample over the 1993-2009 period under the 
assumption of a -0.2 price elasticity. The black-coloured area represents the share of the deadweight loss that 
is due to negative margins, i.e. prices that are set under the marginal cost. The grey-coloured area represents 
the share of the deadweight loss that results from positive margins, i.e. prices set above the marginal cost.  
 
Figure 2. Industry's deadweight loss under a price-elasticity of -0.5 
Note: this figure depicts the computed deadweight loss for the sample over the 1993-2009 period under the 
assumption of a -0.5 price elasticity. The black-coloured area represents the share of the deadweight loss that 
is due to negative margins, i.e. prices that are set under the marginal cost. The grey-coloured area represents 
the share of the deadweight loss that results from positive margins, i.e. prices set above the marginal cost.  
 
 
  
 
Figure 3. Industry's deadweight loss under a price-elasticity of -0.8 
Note: this figure depicts the computed deadweight loss for the sample over the 1993-2009 period under the 
assumption of a -0.8 price elasticity. The black-coloured area represents the share of the deadweight loss that 
is due to negative margins, i.e. prices that are set under the marginal cost. The grey-coloured area represents 
the share of the deadweight loss that results from positive margins, i.e. prices set above the marginal cost.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4. Water company's deadweight loss under a price-elasticity of -0.2 from 1993 to 2009 
Note: this figure depicts the computed deadweight loss for each company over the 1993-2009 period under the 
assumption of a -0.2 price elasticity. The black-coloured area represents the share of the deadweight loss that 
is due to negative margins, i.e. prices that are set under the marginal cost. The grey-coloured area represents 
the share of the deadweight loss that results from positive margins, i.e. prices set above the marginal cost.  
  
 
 Figure 5. Water company's deadweight loss under a price-elasticity of -0.5 from 1993 to 2009 
Note: this figure depicts the computed deadweight loss for each company over the 1993-2009 period under the 
assumption of a -0.5 price elasticity. The black-coloured area represents the share of the deadweight loss that 
is due to negative margins, i.e. prices that are set under the marginal cost. The grey-coloured area represents 
the share of the deadweight loss that results from positive margins, i.e. prices set above the marginal cost.  
 
  
Figure 6. Water company's deadweight loss under a price-elasticity of -0.8 from 1993 to 2009 
Note: this figure depicts the computed deadweight loss for each company over the 1993-2009 period under the 
assumption of a -0.8 price elasticity. The black-coloured area represents the share of the deadweight loss that 
is due to negative margins, i.e. prices that are set under the marginal cost. The grey-coloured area represents 
the share of the deadweight loss that results from positive margins, i.e. prices set above the marginal cost.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
